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Introduction 
The issue of central bank independence and governance (CBIG) has generated considerable 
debate over recent years. As central banks are created by government legislation, there is 
always some kind of a relationship between the central bank and the government. Indeed, it 
may not be possible to completely separate them; the debate today is about the appropriate 
degree of separation.    
The main researchers of CBIG have developed different indices and measurement tools of 
independence and governance. They focus primarily on legal and political aspects. Some also 
addressed the monetary policy, economic independence or accountability and transparency 
aspects. Just as the CBIG is subject to debate, the definition of legal, political, economic and 
other aspects of independence has generated a range of views. What one author calls as legal 
independence, others have identified as political or economic or policy independence. The 
same problem exists in determining which variables should be used to measure CBIG.  
The purpose of this paper is to identify the key determinants of CBIG, to develop an index 
model and a workable definition of CBIG and to show the policy implication of each aspect of 
the index separately. The specific contribution of this paper is CBIG definition and six factor 
index model comprised of legal, political, price stability objective, exchange rate policy, 
monetary policy and deficit financing and finally, accountability and transparency. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows, the next section, explains independence 
and governance for a central Bank. The third section categorises the existing literature into six 
different aspects of CBIG. The fourth section proposes an index model of determinants of 
CBIG to address the problems in the existing literature. The fifth section the index 
construction and finally, the conclusion of the study. 
Independence and Governance for a Central Bank 
Independence and governance are two key terms relates to central bank. Independence refers 
to the ability of the central bank to use the instruments of monetary control without 
instruction, guidance or interference from the government (Henning, 1994). On the other 
hand, according to Amtenbrink (2004), the three pillars of central bank governance are: i). 
central bank independence, ii). central bank accountability, and iii). central bank 
transparency. So, it means good governance in a central bank is a function of its independence 
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and some other factors and iindependence and governance should go hand in hand.  
Other authors have their view in explaining independence and governance as well. The word 
“governance” is synonymous with the exercise of authority, direction, and control (Zingales, 
1997). A central bank can easily be considered with a corporate body, and all the corporate 
governance issues for a corporation are mostly applicable for a central bank. Similarly, the 
issues of authority (authority to execute its policies); direction (direct the economy towards its 
objectives) and finally, control (control its tools and techniques for achieving its goal) are also 
applicable for a central bank.  
Previously, the central bank literature was mostly concentrated on the independence issue, but 
the current literature is very much directed towards governance of central bank, which 
includes, analytical framework of degree of autonomy, directors and their functions and the 
board of the bank and its management (Lybek and Morris, 2004). Moreover, it also means 
the credibility of the monetary policy and appropriate reform of central bank legislation 
(Lybek, 2004). The central bank independence (CBI) indices developed by different 
researchers are discussed in the determinants of CBIG section. A close look at the variables 
included in those indices would reveal that they covered most of the aspects of today’s 
governance issues. Similarly, the index model developed for this study covers both 
independence and governance issues, such as, the office term, authority to appoint and 
dismiss the governor are in legal index, structure of the board, independence of the board 
members are in political index, whether the price stability objective is sacrificed to the political 
agenda of the government is covered in price stability objective index, share of controlling 
authority between the central bank and market is in the foreign exchange index, monetary 
policy independence and government borrowing in monetary policy and deficit financing 
index, and finally, reporting, meeting information, audit and accountability of the governor in 
the accountability and transparency index. 
Our analysis of the existing literature identified a range of definitional and variable overlapping 
problems. In Table: 1 these key definitional and overlap problems are shown across different 
indices. The identification of correct definition and variables are also very important from 
policy implication point of view. Use of incorrect variable for certain policy independence and 
governance would indicate wrong policy implications.  
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Table 1.  Overlap of Variables 
Policy/Economic 
Independence 
Political Independence Legal Independence Accountability & 
Transparency 
Central bank governance 
Bade and Parkin 
(1988) 
-Central bank laws 
(L) 
 
-Inflation (I) 
 
-Policy variability (P) 
 
-Appointment of 
governor (G) 
Grilli, Masciandaro, 
and Tabellin  (1991) 
- Legal capacity to 
choose the final goal 
of monetary policy 
(L) 
-Inflation (I) 
-Economic activity (P) 
 
-Appointment of 
central banker (G) 
Cukierman, Webb and 
Neyapti (1992) 
 
- Inflation (I) 
 
-The policy formulation 
and objective of the 
central bank (P) 
-Governor turnover (G) 
de Haan, 
Amtenbrink and 
Eijffinger(1999) 
-Does the central 
bank law stipulate 
the objectives of 
monetary policy? 
(L) 
-Policy formulation 
(P) 
-Dismissal and 
appointment of the 
governor (G) 
Amtenbrink (2004) 
 
Three pillars of central 
bank governance 
-Central bank 
independence 
-Central bank 
accountability 
-Central bank 
transparency 
Alesina and Sachs 
(1988) Alesina 
(1989) 
-Appointment and 
dismissal from office 
of the directors (G) 
-Inflation (I) 
Cukierman and Webb 
(1995) 
-Timing and 
frequency of governor 
turnover (G) 
Posen (1993) 
-Central bank regulation 
(L) 
-Inflation (I) 
 Lybek (2004) 
-Credibility of monetary 
policy (P) 
-Reform of central bank 
legislation (L) 
Eijffinger and 
Schaling  (1992, 
1993a, 1993b) 
-A government 
representative 
appointed on the 
bank board (G) 
 de Haan, and Van ‘T 
Hag (1994) 
-Central bank regulation 
(L) 
-Inflation (I) 
 Lybek and Morris 
(2004) 
Elements of good 
governance 
-Analytical framework of 
degree of autonomy 
-Directors and their 
functions 
-Important elements of 
boards and management 
Source: Ahsan, Skully and Wickramanayake (2004) with slight modification  
The overlapping variables across the columns are shown by alphabetic symbols such as (G)= 
Governor, (I)= Inflation, (L) = Law, (P)= Policy and Economy by Ahsan, Skully and 
Wickramanayake (2004). The difference is just not definitional but also relates to the 
determinants of each aspect of independence and their policy implication.  
Determinants of Central Bank Independence and Governance  
To identify the correct determinants of CBIG, the existing literatures have been classified into 
following sub-sections: legal aspects, political aspects, price stability objective aspects, 
exchange rate policy aspects, monetary policy and deficit financing aspects and finally, 
transparency and accountability aspects. 
Legal Aspects 
The independence and governance of legal aspect refers to the freedom or flexibility 
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permitted to a central bank by legislation.  This is an important aspect of the overall CBIG. 
“Legal independence is one, but certainly not the sole, determinants of central bank 
independence. It also suggests the degree of independence that legislators meant to confer to 
the central bank,” however, as Cukierman (1993, pp. 274) defined, similarly other authors 
have their own definitions and method of independence measure. Table 2 provides summary 
of a selection of the key papers.  
Table 2.Legal Aspects of CBIG 
Author(s) Measure of CBIG Sample and 
Period 
Test Result 
Bade and Parkin 
(1988) 
The relationship between 
central bank legislation and 
the financial and budgetary 
relationship.  
11 countries, 
all European 
countries 
except New 
Zealand 
1963-1992 
Ranking  No association discerned 
between policy independence 
and the two features of 
monetary policy, inflation level 
and variability.  
Grilli, 
Masciandaro and 
Tabellini  (1991) 
The legislative capacity to 
choose the final goals of 
policy.  
18 OECD  
countries 
 
1950 to 
1989 
Regression The central bank’s constitutional 
position is clearly strengthened 
if its role in preserving monetary 
stability is explicitly stated in the 
constitutions. 
Cukierman, 
Webb and 
Neyapti  (1992) 
 
 
 
The legal characteristics of the 
CB are grouped into four 
clusters of issues: turnover 
rate of governors, the policy 
formulation, the objective of 
the CB and limitations on the 
ability of the CB to lend to 
the public sector 
72 countries 
both 
developing  
and industrial 
 
 
1950 to 
1989 
Regression   Legal independence is significant 
determinant of price stability 
among industrial countries but 
not in developing countries. The 
turnover rate is not significant in 
explaining variations of inflation 
within the industrial countries.  
de Haan and 
Van ‘T Hag 
(1994) 
 
Countries whose CBs do not 
regulate financial institutions 
are keener against inflation, 
and have therefore, more 
independent central banks. 
OECD 
countries 
 
1980-1989 
 
Regression Limited support found for CBI 
In a cross country relationship between the monetary policy and the central bank legislation, 
Bade and Parkin (1988) found no association between independence (legal) and the two 
features of monetary policy, inflation level and variability. Where as Grilli, Masciandaro, 
Tabellini (1991), Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992) found legal independence as a 
significant determinant factor. In another study, de Haan and Van ‘T Hag (1994) used a 
much shorter time period of ten years compared to forty years used by Grilli, Masciandaro, 
Tabellini (1991) and found limited support of CBIG. 
So, the most of the studies found evidence of CBIG related to the legislative protection of its 
operational and policy formulation activities. Li et al., (2005) also considers law enforcement 
as one of the factor of corporate governance. In some of the studies, legal aspects of 
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independence have been identified as political aspects. As politicians are dealing with the legal 
aspects of a country and central bank, it is sometimes difficult to separate them.  
Political Aspects 
The political independence and governance reflects the degree to which the central bank is 
allowed to pursue its main objective, presumably price stability, without interference from the 
political authorities. The influences of partisan electoral cycles on macroeconomic policy were 
first described and analysed expressively by Hibbs (1977). The central bank’s political 
independence is determined by a number of factors, including the procedures for appointing 
the central bank’s chairman and independence of board members, the term of office of 
central bank officials (Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini 1991). Investigating another aspect of 
political independence, a cross-country study reveals that the output costs of disinflations are 
higher, not lower, in countries with central banks that are politically independent (Fischer 
1996, Jordan 1997 and Posen 1998). Table 3 summarises the finding of few studies in this 
regard. 
Table 3.Political Aspects of CBIG 
Author(s) Measure of Independence Sample and Period Test Result 
Grilli, 
Masciandaro and  
Tabellini 
(1991) 
The political independence is 
determined by (i.) the 
procedure for appointing the 
members of the CB bodies; 
(ii) the relationship between 
these bodies and the 
government; and (iii) the 
formal responsibilities of the 
CB.  
18 OECD  
countries 
 
 
1950 to 1989 
Regression If government appoint the 
governor, mandatory to 
have government 
representative in the board, 
no legal provision then 
political independence 
index will be very low. 
de Haan and 
Van ‘T Hag 
(1994) 
The higher the level of 
political stability, the more 
independence that is granted 
to the central bank. 
OECD countries 
 
1980-1989 
Regression The CBI is negatively 
related with political 
instability. 
Cukierman (1993) 
Cukierman and 
Webb (1995) 
Measuring the degree of 
political influence on the 
central bank autonomy. 
67 industrial and 
developing 
countries  
1950-1989 
Regression   Positive influence of the 
political instability on the 
central bank autonomy. 
Grier and Grier 
(2004) 
 
The study measures the effect 
of elections on the real 
exchange rate process and the 
effect of CBI. 
9 Latin American 
countries 
 
1980-2000 
Regression The politicians seek to 
delay potentially politically 
costly real exchange rate 
depreciation until an 
election.  
 
Generally, political parties like to remain in power. So, they will use or misuse central bank 
policy to fulfil their own political agendas. Similarly, political instability also can affect CBIG. 
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Evidence of such a negative relationship was found in OECD countries during 1980 to 1989 
(de Haan and Van ‘T Hag, 1994). Cukierman (1993) and Cukierman and Webb (1995) 
found similar evidence. Both studies covered 67 industrial and developing countries and 
longer time period than de Haan and Van ‘T Hag. This political influence can affect country’s 
monetary policy, interest rate and even the exchange rate.  
Price stability objective aspects 
The delegation of monetary policy power to central banks is believed to lower inflation and 
ensure independence and governance. Bade and Parkin (1985) conducted one of the first 
empirical studies of this link. A number of studies have since found empirical support for this 
negative relationship between CBIG and inflation in industrial countries (Alesina and 
Summers, 1993). The empirical evidence from the developing countries, however, has been 
less clear-cut. Table 4 details a few key papers on this relationship.   
Table 4.Price Stability Objective Aspects of CBIG 
Author(s) Measure of Independence Sample and 
Period 
Test Result 
Grilli, 
Masciandaro and  
Tabellini (1991) 
Estimating the effect on 
inflation of the indicators of 
economic and political 
independence. 
18 OECD  
countries 
1950 to 1989 
Regression CBI always has a negative 
effect on inflation  
Cukierman, 
Webb and  
Neyapti (1992) 
 
Examine relationship 
between inflation; turn over 
rate of governor and level of 
independence.  
72 countries 
developing and 
industrial 
1950 to 1989 
Regression   Less independence 
contributes to higher 
inflation. The turnover of the 
governors contributes 
significantly to explaining 
inflation. 
de Haan and 
Van ‘T Hag 
(1994) 
 
 
Examine the relationship 
between CBI and inflation, 
employment, monetary 
policy, and inflation in a non-
regulatory environment.  
OECD countries 
 
1980-1989 
 
Regression CBI is positively related to 
historical inflation experience. 
Cukierman and 
Webb (1995) 
 
Measure the relationship 
between inflation and CBI 
67 industrial and 
developing 
countries  
1950-1989 
Regression Developing countries have, 
on average, higher and more 
variable inflation than 
industrial countries do 
Brumm and  
Krashevski (2003) 
Examine the relationship 
between a countries sacrifice 
ratio and CBI. 
Analyse problem 
of the previous 
studies 
Regression Strong negative relationship 
between the sacrifice ratio 
and CBI.  
Ismihan and  
Ozkan (2004) 
 
Relationship between CBI, 
public investment and 
inflation.  
Theoretical two 
period model  
 
Model of 
policy 
making 
Argues that the effects on 
growth make CBI less likely to 
achieve lower inflation in the 
long term. 
The study developing and industrial countries by Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992) and 
Cukierman and Webb (1995) reveals that legal independence is inversely related to the 
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inflation in industrial countries but not in developing ones. Similarly, other studies by Grilli, 
Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991), de Haan and Van ‘T Hag (1994), and Brumm and 
Krashevski (2003) found negative relationship between the CBIG and the level of inflation in 
the country. The negative effect of the CBIG does not only affect the inflation in the short run 
but also has more severe long run effects on public investment and future growth of the 
country, Ismihan and Ozkan (2004).  As a result it is very unlikely a country can achieve 
lower inflation rate in the long run as well.   
Exchange Rate Policy Aspects 
Traditionally finance ministries or treasuries have held ultimate responsibility for exchange rate 
policy of a country. At the very least, this responsibility is shared between governments and 
central banks. The degree of independence afforded to the central bank is critical in the ability 
of the government to pursue exchange rate targets (Baines, 2001). Table 5 presents different 
areas of foreign exchange policy related to CBIG.  
Table 5.Exchange Rate Policy Aspects of CBIG 
Author(s) Measure of Independence Sample & Period Test Result 
Baines (2001) 
 
 
CBI is examined as a proxy 
for foreign exchange market 
intervention.  
12 
industrialised 
countries 
 
1973 to 1998 
Regression Negative relationship between 
foreign exchange intervention 
and CBI 
Kuttner and Posen 
(2001) 
Measures the impact of 
central bank autonomy on 
inflation and exchange rate.  
41 countries 
OECD, Latin 
America, East 
Asia  
1998 to 2000 
Regression Central bank autonomy is 
associated with a more stable 
exchange rate and lower 
inflation 
de Souza   (2002) 
 
 
Estimates if the different 
monetary and exchange rate 
framework yield different 
outcomes in terms of level 
and variance of a set of 
nominal and real variables.  
Accession 
countries of 
Central and 
Eastern Europe 
and Baltic 
1989 to 2001 
Regression A flexible exchange rate 
regime, coupled with an 
independent monetary 
authority and inflation 
targeting, would be pareto-
improving when compared to 
harder regime.  
Grier and Grier 
(2004) 
 
 
 
The study measures the effect 
of elections on the real 
exchange rate process and the 
effect of CBI on the effect. 
9 Latin 
American 
countries 
 
1980-2000 
Regression CBR has on average wiped 
out electorally motivated 
RER, depreciations, reduced 
the average rate of RER 
depreciation and lowered RER 
uncertainty.  
The level of CBIG is also related to the exchange rate policy of a country. Baines (2001), 
using the same sample as Eijffinger-Schaling (1992) found a negative relationship between 
foreign exchange market intervention and CBIG. In a study of broad data set of nearly 200 
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monetary frameworks Kuttner and Posen (2001) found that central bank autonomy is 
associated with more stable exchange and lower inflation rate. Using the same methodology, 
de Souza (2002) concluded that a flexible exchange rate regime, coupled with an 
independent monetary authority and inflation targeting, would be pareto-improving when 
compared to harder regime. 
Monetary Policy and Deficit Financing Aspects 
Monetary policy is identified with the nature of the instruments under control of the central 
bank such as the interest rate and/or the ability to conduct open market operations. 
Consequently, the greater the government influence on the monetary financing of the budget 
deficit, the smaller degree of independence of the central bank (Grilli, Masciandaro and 
Tabellini 1991, Bade and Parkin 1988, Alesina and Sachs 1988, Alesina 1989). If monetary 
policy is mishandled, inflation may become rapid and volatile. But, timely, modest interest 
responses to inflation surprises can contribute powerfully to long-run financial stability 
(Sinclair, 2000). Table 6 presents the summary of the key papers with an objective to find 
out a uniform or common set of determinant factors of monetary policy and deficit financing.  
Bade and Parkin (1988) investigate the cross-country relationship between the monetary 
policy and central bank found no association between them. Later their test was extended by 
Alesina and Sachs (1988) and Alesina (1989) by adding an extra criterion and found the 
same result like Bade and Parkin. The policy independence of central bank is also measured by 
Eijffinger and Schaling (1992, 1993b) by identifying the capacity of central banks to choose 
the final goals of monetary policy. They have concluded that incomplete policy authority and 
twin authority in central bank make the bank less independent.  
The budget deficit may lead to inflation, particularly when the financial market is not 
developed and the central bank is not independent (Neyapti 2003). Similarly, interference in 
capital market by the government reduces the allocation efficiency of the capital market and 
may reduce growth. Similarly, countries with lower independence also have lower level of 
private investment. So, the level of financial development and CBIG determine a country’s the 
level of growth in country (Cukierman, Kalaitzidakis, Summers, and Webb 1993).  
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Table 6. Monetary Policy Aspects and Deficit Financing of CBIG 
Author(s) Measure of Independence Sample & Period Test Result 
Bade and Parkin 
(1988) 
The two types of 
independence are policy 
independence and 
financial independence 
11 countries, all 
European 
countries except 
New Zealand 
1963-1992 
Ranking  No association can be 
discerned between policy 
independence and the two 
features of monetary policy, 
inflation level and 
variability.  
Alesina and Sachs 
(1988) 
Alesina (1989) 
 
Alesina includes one 
more variable to BP 
policy index, whether the 
CB is obligated to buy 
short-term Treasury 
paper? 
11 countries, 10 
European and NZ 
1963-1992 
Ranking  No association can be 
discerned between average 
inflation and the degree of 
CBI for the countries.    
Grilli, 
Masciandaro and  
Tabellini (1991) 
Economic independence 
means (i.) level of 
borrowing from CB and 
(ii) the nature of the 
monetary instruments 
under the control of the 
CB. 
18 OECD 
countries 
 
1950 to 1989 
Regression  
and Ranking 
The economic 
independence of CB is 
greater if direct credit to 
the government is: non-
automatic and very 
restrictive.   
Eijffinger and 
Schaling (1992, 
1993b) 
 
 
Policy independence is 
determined by 1). power 
to formulate monetary 
policy  2). government 
representatives in the 
bank board 3) are more 
than half the board 
members appointed 
independently of the 
government? 
11 countries, all 
European 
countries except 
New Zealand 
 
1963-1992 
Ranking  Incomplete policy authority, 
and twin authority in central 
bank makes the bank less 
independent. 
Cukierman, 
Kalaitzidakis, 
Summers and 
Webb (1993) 
Examining the 
relationship between 
growth and CBI. 
70 countries 
LDC and industrial 
1960 to 1989 
Regression  The main finding of the 
paper is that CBI has a 
positive effect on growth in 
LDCs and no effect within 
industrial countries.  
Sinclair (2000) 
 
 
The focus of this study is 
the powers and formal 
functions of the central 
banks to determine the 
nature of the financial 
stability policy  
Total 37 (13 
industrial, 16 
developing & 8 
transition) CBs.  
Survey in 2000 
Survey  Where financial markets are 
usually less developed CB’s 
regulatory and supervisory 
functions is negatively 
correlated with their degree 
of independence. 
Sterne (1999) 
 
 
To assess the targets of 
the monetary policy in a 
range of economies.  
91 central banks  
Survey in 1998 
Survey  Explicit monetary policy 
targets have become more 
widely used in the 1990s 
than Bretton Woods era. 
Neyapti (2003) 
 
 
The degree of both 
financial market 
development and CBI 
affect not only the 
degree of monetary 
accommodation of 
budget deficits in a given 
period but also the 
expectations about future 
monetary 
accommodations of 
budget deficit. 
54 developed and 
less developed 
countries, time-
series data of 10-
20 years. 
Hypothesis 
testing 
The budget deficits lead to 
inflation particularly when 
the financial market is not 
developed and the central 
bank is not independent. 
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Accountability and Transparency:  
Transparency of central banks has been defined as the degree of genuine understanding of the 
monetary policy process and policy decisions by the public (Winkler, 2000). Sometimes, 
transparency refers to the activities of the central bank in providing information (Geraats, 
2000).  For a long time, central banks have been associated with secrecy. Fraser (1994, p.6) 
argues, “as a central bank becomes more independent, it needs to be more accountable for its 
actions.” In the context of a public corporation, a survey of corporate governance by 
Claessens and Fan (2002) reveals that low transparency results from lo level of corporate 
governance. Recently, various central banks embraced openness. A comprehensive survey of 
94 central banks by Fry, Goodhart and Almeida (1996) reveals that 74% of the respondents 
consider transparency a vital or very important component of their monetary policy 
framework. Here, table 7 focuses on different measures and findings of transparency, 
accountability and CBIG covered in few key papers.  
Table 7. Transparency, Accountability of CBIG 
Author(s) Measure of Independence Sample and 
Period 
Test Result 
de Haan, 
Amtenbrink and 
Eijffinger (1999) 
 
Examine the relationship 
between CBI and 
accountability, indicator for 
democratic accountability 
16 central 
banks 
Indicator 
constructed 
in 1998 
Regression Negative relationship 
between CBI and 
accountability.  
Eijffinger and 
Hoebrichts 
(2002) 
 
 
A theoretical model of 
transparency includes, the 
transparency and authority of 
final responsibility for 
monetary policy.   
5 key central 
banks 
 
 
Model 
developed  
The author shows that 
more transparency leads, 
low rate of inflation, less 
stabilization of supply 
shock.  
de Haan and  
Amtenbrink 
(2003) 
 
 
 
An indicator of central bank 
to measure their disclosure by 
taking objectives, strategy, 
communication strategy.  
ECB and 5 
other 
countries.  
Indicator 
constructed 
in 2003 
Construction 
of disclosure 
index 
The ECB ranks high on 
the proposed central bank 
disclosure indicator. 
Nevertheless, evidence 
suggesting that financial 
markets do not consider 
the ECB to be 
transparent. 
de Haan, Amtenbrink and Eijffinger, (1999) explain the central bank accountability with 
three different aspects, in a test of three aspects, the first aspect of the accountability shows a 
positive relationship (not significant) but the rest of the two aspects, transparency and 
responsibility appear to have a negative relationship (significant) with CBI. The overall 
conclusion is that there is a negative relationship between CBI and transparency, which 
contrary to the general notion of positive relationship between the CBI and the transparency.  
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In one of the later studies the concept of democratic accountability of central banks is 
outlined, and compared the legal accountability of European Central Bank (ECB) with some 
other central banks by A theoretical model of transparency for the central banks has been 
developed by taking two major issues into consideration; they are: the transparency of actual 
monetary policy and the question of who bears final responsibility for monetary policy.  This 
model is built on the earlier work by Transparency reduces the uncertainty about the central 
bank’s preferences and can be achieved by publication of relevant information.  
The model of democratic accountability was developed by Eijffinger and Hoebrichts (2002), 
based on the earlier work done by Lohmann (1992), Schaling and Nolan (1998) and 
Eijffinger, Hoebrichts and Schaling (2000). They reached to a conclusion that the 
accountability through transparency leads to a lower expected rate of inflation. 
The Model of CBIG 
From the survey of the CBIG literature, six major determinants have been identified. The 
selections of variables for each aspect are designed in a way, so that overlapping problems can 
be solved and hence, an effective model of CBIG can be developed and the correct policy 
implications of each index can be identifies (see figure: 1).  
Legal Aspects 
The legal independence is measured by law and legislation passed by the government. It 
measures, the term of office of Governor/CEO mentioned in the law, who has the legal 
power to appoint and dismiss the Governor/CEO, and also whether the regulation and 
supervision responsibility of the central bank has been separated from it or not. If the term of 
the governor is longer than the term of the government then it is considered more 
independent. Similarly, if the regulation responsibility has been separated then it means the 
central bank has been allowed to devote more time in its own objectives than supervising the 
entire banking sector.  
Political Aspects 
The issues covered under this aspect are the political or non-political turnover of 
Governor/CEO, the proportion of government representatives in the management board of 
the bank and also whether the Governor/CEO hold other office in the government or not. If 
the governor is changed within the six months after a new national election, then it is 
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considered as political turnover. If the change is due to any other reason, then it is considered 
as non-political turnover. 
 
 
Price and Inflation Stability Aspects 
 The most important or the only desired objective of any central bank is the price stability. If 
the central bank has other objective with price stability then its ability to achieve the main 
objective will be hampered. Banks, which follow targeting method for maintaining inflation 
and interest rate, are in a better shape to maintain price stability.  
Figure 1. Model of CBIG  
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Exchange Rate Policy Aspects 
The role of central bank would vary depending upon the fixed, managed or floating system it 
is adopting. The other issues need to be examined are: who decides exchange rate regime, 
intervention on the foreign exchange, foreign exchange control and foreign exchange 
borrowings.  
Monetary Policy and Deficit Financing Aspects 
 
CBIG 
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The monetary policy and deficit financing independence of a central bank can be determined 
by examining- authority responsible for monetary policy formulation, the final word in 
resolution of conflict, lending to the government, its terms and conditions. Flexible maturity 
and low interest rate on loan will always make a central bank financially inefficient.  
 
Accountability and Transparency Aspects 
The objectives of a transparent central bank should always be clear and easy to understand. It 
will set its priorities and would communicate with people. Reporting of economic and other 
related data increases the confidence of other participants in the economy about the activities 
of the central bank.  A central bank can be accountable but preferably to the parliament 
instead of government, otherwise there is a possibility of being dictated by the government.  
The six arrows from the six aspects indicate how they all together determine CBIG. This index 
model also paves the path for a workable definition of CBIG. The workable definition is---
CBIG means that a bank has the legal power to protect its self from external influence, has the 
freedom to set its monetary policy and can implement its objectives without any political 
interference, can select the appropriate instruments to control the price, inflation, exchange 
rate stability and limited accountability to the parliament of the country to keep its activities 
transparent. 
Index construction: 
Given the model of CBIG in figure 1, six sub indices are constructed with 27 variables. 1. 
Legal Aspects (CBIGLeg), 2. Political Aspects (CBIGPol), 3. Price Stability Objective Aspects 
(CBIGPStab), 4. Exchange Rate Policy Aspects (CBIGForx), 5. Monetary Policy and Deficit 
Financing Aspects (CBIGMonPol), 6. Accountability and Transparency Aspects 
(CBIGAccTrans). The methodology of Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992) together with 
de Haan, and Amtenbrink (2003) and Neyapti (2003) is used to select the variables for 
most indices. For the index of foreign exchange policy aspect, a survey of developing country 
central banks by Fry, Goodhart and Almeida (1996) was followed. Other studies by different 
authors also helped identifying variables for the index. The detail of the index construction is 
presented in Appendix 1& 2.  
The multiple answers under each variable are structured from most weighty to less weighty. 
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The most weighty (most independent) receives a hundred percent weight and then the weight 
gradually decreases according to the contribution to independence and governance.  
Conclusion 
This paper developed an index model covering all necessary aspects of CBIG. Within this 
model each aspect is defined carefully to avoid any overlapping problems and capable of 
showing the policy implication of each aspects separately. The policy implications of applying 
this model in practice are substantial. It will help to develop correct indices and ranking 
techniques to evaluate the independence and governance of central bank. This model is 
capable of assessing the CBIG in any economy. The model has its advantages over other 
previous indices. Central banks would be in a better position to manage its inflation, exchange 
rate, economic growth and monetary policy. These are the direct and positive implications of 
the index model. The other implications are that it will motivate the government to take 
correct and necessary actions such as, passing proper laws, making the activities of the central 
bank transparent by removing political or any other influences.  
The study is expected to provide several contributions to the CBIG literature. Firstly, it is the 
first study to address the problem of inconsistent and overlapping definitions by developing a 
workable definition of CBIG. Secondly, it will also be the first model to combine the 
independence and governance issues of central bank. Thirdly, it develops an index of CBIG 
with six determinants (sub indices), so that the most important determinant can be identified. 
The overall index and six sub indices have great policy implications. The overall index shows 
the overall independence and governance of the central bank, whereas the six subindices 
indicate about the strength and weakness of specific aspects of independence and governance.   
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Appendix: 1 Index construction 
 Variables Coding 
1. LEGAL (CBIGLeg)  
a. Terms of office of Governor / CEO  
 6 years or more 1.00 
 5 years 0.67 
 4 years or less 0.33 
 Not Mentioned 0.00 
b. Legal power to appoint Governor/ CEO  
 Board of the central bank 1.00 
 Parliament/Legislature 0.50 
 Government/ Executives 0.00 
c. Legal power to Dismiss Governor/ CEO  
 Board of the central bank 1.00 
 Parliament/Legislature 0.50 
 Government/ Executives 0.00 
d. Has the regulatory responsibility been separated from central bank?  
 Yes 1.00 
 No 0.00 
2. POLITICAL (CBIGPol)  
a. Turnover of Governor / CEO  
 Political (if, the Governor changed with in 6 months of political change) 0.00 
 Non-political  1.00 
b. Members of the management board of Bank  
 Non government persons 1.00 
 Not mentioned government or non-government 0.67 
 Government Employees 0.33 
 Government Ministers 0.00 
c. Does Governor/CEO hold other office in the government?  
 No, Governor/CEO does not 1.00 
 Yes, he/ she does 0.00 
3. PRICE STABILITY OBJECTIVES (CBIGPStab)  
a. Price stability   
 It is the major or only objective of the bank 1.00 
 Price stability is one objective with other compatible objectives 0.67 
 No objectives stated in the bank charter 0.33 
 Stated objectives do not include price stability 0.00 
b. Inflation   
 Inflation targeting and forecasting by CB 1.00 
 Not done by the CB 0.00 
c. Interest rate  
 Interest rate setting and managed by CB 1.00 
 Not done by the CB 0.00 
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4. EXCHANGE RATE POLICY (CBIGForx)  
a. Intervention of the foreign exchange market is decided by whom  
 Central Bank 1.00 
 Jointly 0.50 
 Government 0.00 
b. Foreign exchange market regulations done by whom  
 Central Bank 1.00 
 Jointly 0.50 
 Government 0.00 
c. Foreign exchange borrowings are decided by whom  
 Central Bank 1.00 
 Jointly 0.50 
 Government 0.00 
5. MONETARY POLICY AND DEFICIT FINANCING (CBIGMonPol)  
a. Who is responsible for monetary policy formulation  
 Bank alone 1.00 
 Bank participates, but has little influence 0.67 
 Bank only advise government 0.33 
 Bank has no say 0.00 
b. Who has the final word in resolution of conflict?  
 The Bank, clearly defined in the law 1.00 
 A council of the central bank, executive branch, and legislative branch 0.50 
 Government and Executive branch 0.00 
c. Lending to the government  
I. Lending  
 Not permitted  1.00 
 Permitted, but with strict limits (e.g. up to 15% of government revenue) 0.67 
 Permitted, and the limits are loose (e.g. over 15% of government revenue) 0.33 
 No legal limits on lending 0.00 
II. Terms of lending  
 Controlled by the bank 1.00 
 Specified by the bank charter 0.67 
 Agreed between the central bank and executive 0.33 
 Decided by the executive branch alone 0.00 
III. Maturity of loans  
 Within 6 months 1.00 
 Within 1 year 0.67 
 More than 1 year 0.33 
 Not mentioned in the law 0.00 
IV. Interest rates on loan must be  
 At market rates or above minimum rate 1.00 
 Below market rate 0.67 
 Interest rate is not mentioned 0.33 
 No interest on government borrowing  0.00 
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6. ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY (CBIGAccTrans)  
a. Objectives of the bank has the following features  
 Written objectives 1.00 
 Clear priorities 1.00 
b. Communication strategy  
 Policy Explanations provided for public 1.00 
 Press conference/ media release  1.00 
 Publication of minutes of Board meeting 1.00 
c. Reporting of banking activities publicly  
 Periodic report publication  
 Yes published 1.00 
 No 0.00 
d. Accountability of the Governor/ CEO  
 Accountable to the Board 1.00 
 Accountable to Parliament 0.50 
 Accountable to Government 0.00 
e. Is the central bank activities are audited?  
 Yes 1.00 
 No 0.00 
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Appendix: 2 Variables description  
Variables of CBIG Index Comment 
1. Term of office of Governor/ CEO  Longer than the government’s term 
2. Legal power to appoint Governor/ CEO  Bank board or parliament not government  
3. Legal power to dismissal of Governor/ CEO  No provision of dismissal, if not, then not by the 
government  
4. Legal responsibility of regulating other banks Separated  
5. Turnover of Governor: Political or non political Political, if changed within six months after change in 
government  
6. Member of the management board of the bank  Members are independent not direct government ministers 
or officers 
7. Does CEO/Governor hold other office in the government?  Should not hold  
8. Objectives of the bank includes price stability Priority on price stability should be highest  
9. Inflation targeting Should have targeting framework in place by central bank 
10. Interest rate setting and management  Central Bank should intervene not government  
11. Intervention on the foreign exchange market Central bank should do independently not by government 
influence 
12. Foreign exchange control  Central bank should do independently not by government 
influence 
13. Foreign exchange borrowings Central bank should do independently not by government 
influence 
14. Responsible for monetary policy formulation  Central bank should formulate 
15. Final word in resolution of conflict Central bank not government  
16. Lending to the government permitted or not?  Should not be permitted, if permitted, strict limit is better 
17. Terms of lending  Terms should be specified by bank charter 
18. Maturity of loans  Lower the maturity is better 
19. Interest rate on loan  Market rate or higher 
20. Written Objectives All objectives of bank should be written  
21. Priorities in objectives Priorities in objective should be written  
22. Policy explanation Providing policy explanation is a legal requirement  
23. Press  or media release Public should be notified about the development and 
changes  
24. Publications of minutes Board meeting minutes should be published 
25. Publication of economic data and reports  Annual report and others  
26. Accountability of the Governor/CEO  To the board or parliament but not to the government  
27. Audit of activities  Regular audit should be done 
 
 
 
